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The Phenomenology of Spin"t has been in rich and equal measures a source of both frustration and fascination to its readers. Coming to it from the more conventional texts of our tradition (even including Hegel's later writings) readers have been puzzled, first, by the structure of the Phenomenology.
Despite his suggestions that he is following an actual historical development of some sort Hegel will pass from the Terror of 1793-94 to prehistoric religions of nature, or from Kantian universality in morality to the life of the Greek polis. In addition the Phenomenology contains a vast number of allusions to particular texts and authors which seems disproportionate to its claim to have followed a necessary path to absolute knowledge. One may have the impression that the highway of despair has been so named because of its constant and confusing detours into wildernesses which have only the most peripheral connection with the promised land of spirit. All of this has prompted an amazing quantity of ingenious hermeneutical activity. The leading directions in such exegesis can be sorted out into the logical (or logical-allegorical), the existential, and the poetic; each is governed by the intention of saving and preserving the integral value of the text. There is also, of course, a skeptical reading of the Phenomenology, often appealing to philological evidence, which attempts to suggest (as in the case of some similar approaches to Kant's first Cn"tique), that what we are dealing with is at best a patchwork of essays on various subjects and with different purposes, hurriedly put together to meet the demands of the printer. I regard the patchwork theory as a last resort and will pass over it in silence here, since I have not yet been reduced to its level of desperation or irony. The logical reading such as that given in recent years by Stanley Rosen claims that the Phenomenology presupposes the Logic rather than serving as an introduction to it; but Hegel repeatedly says that the Phenomenology is such an introduction or ladder to the standpoint of science. An existential approach to the text finds Hegel to have surrendered joyously to the drama and possibilities of the Lebenswelt, both contemporary and historical. As Rohen Solomon puts it in his recent book on Hegel:
It was as if Hegel began a casual drive from Stuttgart . . . to Freiburg to attend another Neo-Kantian lecture on the need THE OWL OF MINERVA for a "system." But driving through the Schwarzwald he became enchanted by the light and the shadows, the dancing forms of the high trunked trees and the sunlight piercing through the umbrella of pine leaves, watched them with increasing absorption in all of their variety and soon enough forgot where he was going, or no longer cared. He had discovered something more exciting than the absolute unity of experience, the transcendental unity of apperception and the synthesis of freedom and nature; he had discovered endless, restless contingency, the transience of forms, Heraclitus' flame, the variety of human experience and the way one form of experience transforms itself, often by a sudden leap, into another ... But then-already late, he dashed to his rendezvous point, ran into the lecture, and quickly tried to forget his most unwissenschaftlich enchantment, his brush with endless contingency and change . 1 A third reading of the Phenomenology is the view that the book's unusual structure and content are to be accounted for by Hegel's reliance on a literary model of some kind. Such suggestions range from Josiah Royce's reading the text in the light of the Bildungsroman (especially Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship), to the claim of John Dobbins and Peter Fuss that it is a redoing of the stages of the Divine Comedy, to Jacob Loewenberg's more general thesis that it is a comedy with many acts in which each form of consciousness with any pretentions to absoluteness is exposed and ridiculed for its self-contradictions. 2 Each of these approaches of course has its own illuminations, but each is limited. The logical reading is a rather forced allegory which is at odds with Hegel's own pronouncements about the text. The same could be said of Kojeve's attempt to see the Phenomenology as a Marxist allegory. The existential reading shows us Hegel, with life and vigor, coming to terms with questions of death, freedom, work, and religion, but it is forced to dismiss his own claims about the systematic point of his work and its elaborate structure as afterthoughts or self-deception.
For some time I was attracted to one or another of the poetic readings of the Phenomenology, in part because they promised to be able to account for the extensive treatment and analysis of literature which occupies so much of the text. 3 If we think of just the last half or so of the book, for example, from spirit
